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Soda Taxes as a Legal and Social Movement 
 




In the last few years, several local governments have adopted new soda taxes.1 Other 
localities currently are considering adopting such a tax. In this Article, we consider whether 
soda taxes are becoming a more common local policy throughout the country—like local 
smoking restrictions—or whether, instead, they will remain a limited legal phenomenon.   
We focus on two potential obstacles to the widespread adoption of local soda taxes: 
(1) policy-based objections to the taxes as regressive and unduly paternalistic, which could 
undermine political support for their adoption at the local level; and (2) state preemption 
of local taxes, often achieved at the behest of the beverage industry. As we explain later, 
the principal risk of preemption vis-à-vis soda taxes does not come from the state courts in 
the form of decisions finding implied or field preemption, but rather from state statutes that 
expressly, unequivocally preempt such taxes. In almost all states, such express preemption 
would be considered lawful by the courts and would be effective in depriving localities of 
the power to impose taxes on soda.  
We suggest two ways in which these obstacles might be overcome. First, linking 
soda tax revenue to programs that provide a clear, uncontroversial benefit to low-income 
populations—such as universal preschool—will mute the policy objections to the adoption 
of soda taxes. Second, we surmise that the beverage industry will find it much easier to 
secure passage of state statutes expressly preempting local soda taxes before soda taxes 
have been adopted and have become the funding source for popular programs. Thus, the 
timing of enactment of local soda taxes may matter a great deal; the more time that elapses 
in a state before the adoption of a soda tax, the greater the likelihood a state preemption 
statute will be enacted first. In short, for those who believe that soda taxes are good policy, 
it is worth noting that speedy adoption of soda taxes that link tax revenue to popular 
programs in as many localities as possible is the surest way for soda taxes to become a 
nationwide legal phenomenon.  
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1 In this Article we use the term “soda tax” loosely to refer to taxes imposed on the manufacture, 
distribution, sale, or consumption of non-alcoholic beverages such as soft drinks, both carbonated and 
uncarbonated, and sweetened, either naturally or artificially. We follow the convention in the public health 
literature to use the term “sugar-sweetened beverages” to refer to all non-diet soft drinks with added sugars 
(e.g., sucrose, fructose, dextrose) including soda, sports drinks, juice drinks, sweetened coffees and teas, 
energy drinks, and so forth. 
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Our analysis here is descriptive and not normative; we take no position on whether 
soda taxes represent good policy. The public health goal of soda taxes is to reduce disease 
by decreasing consumption of sugary beverages. However, the health consequences of soda 
taxes in practice depend on a number of factors, such as: (1) the extent to which taxes affect 
soda prices;2 (2) how those price changes affect the quantity of soda and other goods that 
people consume; and (3) the health consequences of these consumption changes.3 The 
long-term health effects of soda taxes pose complicated empirical questions that would 
require extensive study.4 Nonetheless, a number of respected public health experts endorse 
the soda tax approach,5 so it is useful to consider both the conditions under which such 
taxes might be implemented and then survive legal and political scrutiny. 
Part I briefly reviews the history of soda taxes to date, with attention to how they 
have been structured. Part II focuses on the regressivity and nanny-state objections to soda 
taxes and uses the Philadelphia case study to show how those objections can be muted. Part 
III outlines the law of preemption and explores how soda taxes could be subject to implied, 
field, and express preemption. Part IV develops the argument that state statutory 
preemption is more likely to occur the longer a local government waits to pass and 
implement local soda taxes. For this reason, as a political matter, public health activists 
                                                     
2 Taxes on soda are not necessarily fully passed down to the price faced by consumers. If the market is 
elastic and retailers or producers anticipate consumers switching to substitutes (e.g., water) not subject to 
the tax, they might lower the pre-tax price of the product to compensate. The after-tax price of soda 
therefore might not reflect the entire magnitude of the tax. See, e.g., John Cawley, Barton Willage & David 
Frisvold, Pass-Through of a Tax on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages at the Philadelphia International Airport, 
JAMA (2017), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2660167; John Cawley & David E. 
Frisvold, The Pass-Through of Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages to Retail Prices: The Case of 
Berkeley, California, 36 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS MGMT. 303, 303–26 (2017).  
3 For example, consider how a soda tax might affect consumption of French fries and candy. Consumption 
of either good could have a negative effect on one’s health. However, French fries and soda are 
complements; consumers prefer to consume these goods together. If the tax decreases soda consumption, 
consumers might purchase fewer French fries, which might increase the total health benefit of enacting a 
soda tax. By contrast, soda and candy, which both have high sugar content, are likely substitutes; many 
consumers prefer to consume one or the other, but not both in the same sitting. If consumers decrease soda 
consumption in response to the tax, they might increase consumption of candy, negating some of the health 
benefit of decreasing soda consumption. 
4 A few efforts have been undertaken or are underway. More work needs to be done. See, e.g., Lynn D. 
Silver et al., Changes in Prices, Sales, Consumer Spending, and Beverage Consumption One Year After a 
Tax on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages in Berkeley, California, US: A Before-And-After Study, PLOS MED. 
(Apr. 18 2017), http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002283; M. 
Arantxa Colchero et al., Beverage Purchases from Stores in Mexico Under the Excise Tax on Sugar 
Sweetened Beverages: Observational Study, BMJ (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.bmj.com/content/352/bmj.h6704; Jennifer Falbe et al., Impact of the Berkeley Excise Tax on 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1865 (2016); Vasanti S. Malik, 
Matthias B. Schulze & Frank B. Hu, Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic 
Review, 84 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274 (2006).; Jason M. Fletcher, David E. Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, 
The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes on Child and Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. PUB. 
ECON. 967 (2010); Jason M. Fletcher, David E. Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, Non-Linear Effects of Soda Taxes 
on Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 24 HEALTH ECON. 566 (2015). 
5 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Scharf & Mark D. DeBoer, Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Children’s Health, 37 
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 273 (2016); MARION NESTLE, SODA POLITICS: TAKING ON BIG SODA (AND 
WINNING) (2015); Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention: The Public Policy Case 
for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805 (2009); Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public 
Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599 (2009). 
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who seek local taxation of soda might be wise to try to ensure that as many local ordinances 
as possible are in place prior to the consideration by a state legislature of a state law 
preempting such taxes.  
 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF TAXING SUGARY DRINKS 
 
In the United States, sodas were not always sold in the portion sizes that we are 
accustomed to seeing today. In 1916 Coca-Cola was sold in a 6.5 ounce bottle. The 
company did not introduce larger sizes until the 1950s, and even then most bottled sodas 
contained less than 7 ounces.6 Today’s standard vending machine bottle size is 20 ounces, 
which is three times larger than the original. As a general matter, larger portion size induces 
people to consume more, and also to underestimate the number of calories they are 
consuming.7 Over the past several decades, as the size of bottles and fountain drink cups 
for sugary drinks has increased, the average per person intake of those beverages has also 
increased. The industry’s marketing strategies encourage people to buy and consume larger 
sizes; as a general matter, price per ounce decreases as package size increases. Moreover, 
default options have special influence when people make choices, and default sizes for 
sugary beverages are no exception—when the default portion is large, people will tend to 
consume more than when it is small.8 Public health activist and scholar Marion Nestle 
asserts, “[o]n the basis of calories alone, larger portions are a sufficient explanation for 
rising rates of obesity.”9 Sugar sweetened beverages represent the single largest source of 
added sugars for Americans.10 
One way to encourage people to reduce consumption of sugary drinks is to make 
them relatively more expensive—i.e., by raising the tax inclusive price of soda, holding 
the prices of other goods fixed. Many sugary drinks are not nutritious but widely consumed, 
making them an attractive target for taxation, especially for cash-strapped local and state 
governments.11 The analogy to tobacco in the soda tax debate is one that public health 
officials are examining. The coincident increase in the taxation of tobacco products and 
decline in tobacco use in the United States over the last several decades suggests that 
                                                     
6 NESTLE, supra note 5, at 344. 
7 See generally Brian Wansink & Pierre Chandon, Meal Size, Not Body Size, Explains Errors in Estimating 
the Calorie Content of Meals, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 326 (2006); Barbara J. Rolls, Erin L. Morris & 
Liane S. Roe, Portion Size of Food Affects Energy Intake in Normal-Weight and Overweight Men and 
Women, 76 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1207 (2002). 
8 C. Peter Herman et al., Mechanisms Underlying the Portion-Size Effect, 144 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 129, 
129 (2015); Ingrid HM Steenhuis & Willemijn M. Vermeer, Portion Size: Review and Framework for 
Interventions, 6 INT'L J. BEHAV. NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 58, 58 (2009).  
9 NESTLE, supra note 5, at 345. Holding aside political considerations, taxing soda is an attractive 
proposition from a revenues perspective regardless of how consumers respond. If the price elasticity of 
soda is high, a tax will significantly reduce soda consumption, with attendant health benefits that may free 
up funding for preventative health programs. If, on the other hand, demand for soda is relatively inelastic, 
i.e. consumers do not reduce their soda consumption by very much in response to the tax, the city gains a 
steady and reliable source of revenue. 
10 Peter J. Huth et al., Major Food Sources of Calories, Added Sugars, and Saturated Fat and Their 
Contribution to Essential Nutrient Intakes in the U.S. Diet: Data from the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (2003–2006), 12 NUTRITION J. 116, 118 (2013). 
11 NESTLE, supra note 5, at 362. 
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increasing the tax inclusive price reduces tobacco use.12 This possibility has encouraged 
public health advocates to consider whether health risks associated with sugar consumption 
can be mitigated in the same way.  
State and local taxation of sugary drinks in the U.S. began long ago, not so much as 
a way to discourage consumption, but simply to raise revenue. Some early measures13 
include South Carolina’s 1925 soft drink tax,14 Louisiana’s 1938 wholesale tax on bottled 
soft drinks and syrups,15 Texas’ 1961 sales tax on soft drinks and candy,16 Indiana’s 1963 
sales tax on candy, gum, and bottled drinks,17 and New York State’s 1965 sales tax on soft 
drinks and candy.18 A study by Jacobson and Brownell identified a dozen state and local 
taxes on soft drinks that were later repealed, sometimes after lobbying or pressure by the 
beverage industry.19 Long ago, even the federal government enacted soda taxes to raise 
money for World War I.20   
Currently, most states (34) and some counties tax soft drinks21 at rates that are low 
enough that the effect on sales and consumption may be negligible,22 with revenues 
directed toward the states’ general funds. Many states (about 20) collect sales tax on soft 
drinks at a rate higher than food.23 For example, the state of Illinois collects sales taxes on 
food at a reduced rate of 1–2%, but taxes soft drinks at the “general merchandise” rate of 
6.25%.24 Chicago imposes an additional excise tax of 9% on fountain drink syrup,25 as well 
                                                     
12 Hana Ross et al., Do Cigarette Prices Motivate Smokers to Quit? New Evidence from the ITC Survey, 
106 ADDICTION 609, 609 (2011); Jie-Min Lee, Effect of a Large Increase in Cigarette Tax on Cigarette 
Consumption: An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Sectional Survey Data, 122 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1061, 1061 
(2008).  
13 See Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote 
Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 856 (2000). 
14 $0.01 per twelve ounce container and $0.95 per gallon syrup, repealed in 2001. Id.  
15 2.5%, reduced to 1.25% in 1993, and repealed in 1997. Id. 
16 6.25%, still in effect. Id. at 855.  
17 5% sales tax, still in effect. Id. at 855. 
18 Up to 7.5%, still in effect. Id. at 856. 
19 See generally id. 
20 This tax was short-lived. Caitlin Dewey, What Happened When Congress Decided to Tax All Soda, 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/06/what-happened-when-america-put-a-
national-tax-on-soda/. 
21 See CHRIQUI JF, EDISON SS & CHALOUPKA FJ, BRIDGING THE GAP PROGRAM, HEALTH POLICY CTR., 
INST. FOR HEALTH RESEARCH & POLICY, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., STATE SALES TAXES ON REGULAR SODA 
(AS OF JANUARY 2014) (2014), 
http://www.bridgingthegapresearch.org/_asset/s2b5pb/BTG_soda_tax_fact_sheet_April2014.pdf. 
22 Additionally, taxes charged at checkout do not appear in the price of the item on the shelf. This makes 
the increased cost less salient to the consumer, possibly lowering the probability of decreasing 
consumption. To the extent that raising revenue is the primary goal of these taxes, the fact that they are not 
salient and therefore do not shape behavior is an advantage. See generally, Jacob Goldin, Sales Tax Not 
Included: Designing Commodity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258 (2012). 
23 Id. 
24 Sales & Use Taxes, ILL. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
http://tax.illinois.gov/Businesses/TaxInformation/Sales/rot.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (follow 
“Regulation 130.310” hyperlink). 
25 CITY OF CHI., Fountain Soft Drink Tax (7590), 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/tax_list/fountain_soft_drinktax.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
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as a 3% sales tax on retail sales of soft drinks in cans or bottles.26 These taxes appear to be 
primarily revenue driven, and began long before recent public health discussions regarding 
reducing sugar intake to combat obesity-related disease. 
In the wake of increased concern among public health scholars and advocates about 
the link between sugar and disease, the New England Journal of Medicine published an 
article in 2009 suggesting that a 1 cent per ounce excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverages 
would reduce consumption as well as generate considerable revenue.27 The penny per 
ounce tax would increase the cost of sugary drinks by about 15–20%––substantially more 
than current sales tax rates. Ever since the article was published, certain state and local 
governments have been experimenting with beverage taxes, intended to benefit health by 
generating more substantial revenue (to be used for health and nutrition education and the 
like) or to reduce consumption, or both. Attempts to impose more substantial taxes were 
attempted, but failed in New York State (2008 and 2010), Richmond, California (2012), El 
Monte, California (2012), and San Francisco, California (2014). These efforts were 
opposed strongly by expensive public campaigns launched by the American Beverage 
Association (ABA).28 During some of these campaigns, the beverage industry formed 
alliances with grocers, unions, and even organizations representing racial and ethnic 
minorities. 
Then, in 2014, the voters in Berkeley, CA passed a 1 cent per ounce excise tax on 
sugar-sweetened beverages.29 The campaign received financial assistance from Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, among others, and enjoyed more broad-based support than did previous 
efforts in other localities.30 The law’s stated purpose is to reduce disease associated with 
consumption of these drinks.31 Proceeds fund a variety of nutrition and health related 
programs.32 At the time, beverage industry spokespeople dismissed the Berkeley action as 
sui generis (only Berkeley is Berkeley after all). But in 2016, Philadelphia’s city council 
enacted a substantial 1.5 cents-per-ounce excise tax on beverages with any sweetener 
(including diet), which we discuss in more detail in the next section.33 Later in the 
November 2016 general election, voters in several other municipalities across the U.S. 
(e.g., San Francisco, Oakland, and Albany, CA, as well as Boulder, CO) passed substantial 
taxes on beverages, ranging between 1–2 cents per ounce.34 In addition to these ballot 
                                                     
26 Chicago Home Rule Municipal Soft Drink Retailers’ Occupation Tax, ILL. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/businesses/taxinformation/sales/softdrink.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). 
27 Brownell et al., supra note 5. 
28 Kate Sheppard, Beverage Industry Group Bankrolls Soda Tax Opposition, MOTHER JONES (July 25, 
2012), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2012/07/meet-beverage-industry-group-bankrolls-soda-
tax-opposition/#. 
29 Robert Paarlberg, Dariush Mozaffarian & Renata Micha, Viewpoint: Can U.S. Local Soda Taxes 
Continue to Spread?, 71 FOOD POLICY 1, 1 (2017). 
30 Id. 
31 Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance Imposing a General Tax on the Distribution of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage 
Products (Nov. 2014), 
https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Elections/Sugar%20Sweeetened%20Beverage%20Ta
x%20%20-%20Full%20Text.pdf. 
32 Heather Knight, Berkeley Kept its Word on Soda Tax Proceeds, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 26, 2016), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-soda-tax-changes-flavor-from-2014-10098368.php. 
33 See infra Part II. 
34 Heather Knight, S.F., Oakland, Albany voters pass soda tax, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Sugar-tax-measure-results-10593882.php; Alex Burness, Boulder 
passed the nation's steepest soda tax; now, to implement it, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (Nov. 21, 2016), 
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measures, the  
Seattle City Council passed a sugary beverage tax earmarked for food access and 
education.35 The most significant effort in terms of total revenue projections was the 2017 
sales tax proposed by the Cook County, IL Board of Commissioners on all sweetened 
(including diet) beverages.36 
 
II. POLICY OBJECTIONS TO TAXING BEVERAGES 
 
Although small taxes have been imposed on beverages for almost a century in some 
states and localities, the imposition of larger taxes that might substantially reduce 
consumption (as well as raise substantially more revenue) is a relatively new phenomenon. 
The costs and benefits of these larger beverage taxes are currently the subject of a great 
deal of debate. In this section we briefly review this debate, with emphasis on a few of the 
costs and benefits that loom large in the public’s consciousness.  
In recent years, public health researchers and officials have focused their attention 
on the problem of excess consumption of unhealthful foods and beverages, which they 
associate with diseases that are among leading causes of death.37 This problem has 
increased markedly in the last few decades, and sugar-sweetened beverages have been 
identified as possibly one of the most powerful of many factors.38 Sales taxes usually are 
levied as a percentage of retail price, and are not ideal for discouraging consumption for a 
few reasons. First, they encourage consumers to purchase less expensive brands.39 Second, 
the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) purchases are not subject 
to sales tax.40 Third, these taxes are collected at the cash register and are not part of the 
price consumers see on the product, and so the increase in price is not salient to the 
purchaser at the time of selection.41 By contrast, excise taxes are imposed on distributors 
                                                     
http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ci_30593248/boulder-passed-nations-steepest-soda-tax-now-
implement. 
35 Daniel Beekman, Seattle will tax sugary soda — but not diet, SEATTLE TIMES (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/seattle-city-council-says-yes-to-soda-tax/. 
36 The tax was extremely short-lived—it went into effect on August 2, 2017, and was repealed by 
lawmakers on October 11, 2017, with collections ending on December 1, 2017. The county estimated that 
the tax would have generated about $200 million per year, and it was meant to help close a $1.8 billion 
budget gap. Greg Trotter, What Shoppers Need to Know About the Cook County Soda Pop Tax, CHI. TRIB. 
(June 24, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-cook-county-soda-tax-preview-0625-biz-
20170622-story.html. The tax was not collected on beverages purchased with SNAP, which are not subject 
to sales tax. Id. 
37 Dariush Mozaffarian, Dietary and Policy Priorities for Cardiovascular Disease, Diabetes, and Obesity: 
A Comprehensive Review, 133 CIRCULATION 187, 187 (2016); Renata Micha et al., Association Between 
Dietary Factors and Mortality from Heart Disease, Stroke, and Type 2 Diabetes in the United States, 317 
JAMA 912, 912 (2017). 
38 Malik, Schulze, & Hu, supra note 4, at 274; Scharf & DeBoer, supra note 5, at 273; Brownell & Frieden, 
supra note 5, at 1599. 
39 Brownell & Frieden, supra note 5, at 1807. 
40 Retailer Sales Tax Notice, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/retailer-sales-tax-notice (last updated Aug. 30, 2017). 
41 This is not to say that sales taxes have no effect on purchasing behavior, but rather that taxes included in 
a price are more salient than taxes that are not included in a price. Tax-exclusive pricing can lead to 
consumers under-valuing the tax because it is hidden. See Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 
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and manufacturers rather than retailers, and usually are structured as a fixed cost per ounce. 
When these costs are passed on to consumers, they are included in the price consumers see 
on the price tag, rather than later at the cash register, making the increased price more 
salient, and possibly encouraging reduced consumption. 
The major health policy argument in favor of sugar-sweetened beverage taxes is that 
they will discourage consumption––which will reduce caloric intake from sugar––leading 
to health benefits. However, to the extent that consumers continue to consume soda, the 
tax will generate additional revenues which the local government may use to create or 
expand health-enhancing programs, such as childhood obesity-prevention, health and 
nutrition education, and building facilities to encourage physical activity. Other beneficial 
uses of revenue are possible as well, and we discuss these below in the case of the 
Philadelphia beverage tax.42 
It is still too early to tell with certainty whether imposing substantial taxes on 
sweetened beverages leads to lower consumption43 and ultimately improves health 
outcomes.44 Mexico, a country which has been hit hard by increasing rates of diabetes and 
other health problems, imposed a national excise tax of one peso per liter (about 10%) on 
sugar-sweetened beverages that went into effect in 2014.45 One study of purchases before 
and after the tax went into effect suggests a reduction in purchases of taxed beverages 
(sugar-sweetened) and an increase in purchases of untaxed beverages (e.g., water).46 Time 
will tell whether the results of this single study are replicated. More important than 
reduction in purchases is the ultimate question of whether health outcomes will improve as 
a result of the tax, a question that will be studied as the consequences of the tax unfold in 
Mexico. 
The question of whether taxing sugar-sweetened beverages is an effective method 
for improving health outcomes is the subject of a good deal of debate. In addition to 
concerns about effectiveness, there are other possible disadvantages that have been debated 
extensively. The beverage industry apparently has invested vast resources in 
communication strategies focused on arguments against beverage taxes, including claims 
that the tax will not change consumption or health, and somewhat conversely, that beverage 
taxes will lead to loss of beverage industry jobs and hurt small grocers.47  
One argument the beverage industry often invokes against taxing beverages is that 
government should not act like a “nanny” by telling citizens what and how much they 
                                                     
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) (showing 
experimentally that consumers underreact to sales tax assessed at the register). 
42 See infra Part II. 
43 See, e.g., Falbe et al., supra note 4; Silver et al., supra note 4; Colchero et al., supra note 4; Cawley and 
Frisvold, supra note 2. 
44 See generally Maria A. Cabrera Escobar et al., Evidence that a Tax on Sugar Sweetened Beverages 
Reduces the Obesity Rate: A Meta-Analysis, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1072 (2013). 
45 COLCHERO ET AL., supra note 4. 
46 Id. at 1. 
47 Philly Beverage Tax is a “Job Killer” | American Beverage Association, , 
http://www.ameribev.org/education-resources/blog/post/philly-beverage-tax-is-a-job-killer/ (last visited 
Sep 3, 2017); Tax Foundation: Philly ‘Soda Tax Experiment Failing’ | American Beverage Association, , 
http://www.ameribev.org/education-resources/blog/post/tax-foundation-philly-soda-tax-experiment-failing/ 
(last visited Sep 3, 2017); The Truth About the Berkeley Beverage Tax | American Beverage Association, , 
http://www.ameribev.org/education-resources/blog/post/the-truth-about-the-berkeley-beverage-tax/ (last 
visited Sep 3, 2017). 
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should eat and drink.48 Instead, the argument reasons that adults are capable of making 
their own decisions without government interference or guidance. This argument appears 
to have had a great deal of persuasive power in several of the (ultimately failed) attempts 
to impose substantial beverage taxes or limits. In New York City’s attempt to reduce 
sweetened beverage consumption (limiting the size of sugared drinks to sixteen ounce 
cups), the ABA’s public relations campaign focused on convincing New Yorkers that the 
size cap amounted to a “ban” that intruded upon personal freedom of choice.49 The “nanny-
state” argument struck a chord with many New Yorkers across otherwise familiar divides 
like race, class, and education. Publications like the New Yorker and The New York Times 
joined late night TV hosts and others in the chorus of voices making fun of “nanny-state” 
politics. A now infamous, industry-funded full-page advertisement in The New York Times 
depicted Mayor Bloomberg as a giant nanny in a dress looming over the city, attempting 
to limit the size of pizza slices and bagel toppings.50 Other industry communications 
strategies included distributing t-shirts with the words, “I picked out my beverage all by 
myself.”51 The portion cap rule was ultimately struck down in state court, on the grounds 
that the city’s health department had exceeded the scope of its regulatory authority.52 
During the two-year period between announcement of the rule and the time it was struck 
down by the state’s highest court, the rule remained unpopular among New Yorkers and 
Americans generally,53 and a main flashpoint of discourse about the rule was “nanny-state” 
concerns. 
Another key concern regarding beverage taxes is that of regressivity: taxing both rich 
and poor at the same fixed amount per ounce means that poor consumers will bear a higher 
share of the tax burden than the rich in proportion to their income.54 Relatedly, the 
regressive nature of beverage taxes is aggravated by evidence suggesting that lower-
income individuals consume sugar-sweetened beverages at a greater rate than higher-
income individuals.55 The image of regressive taxation that impacts poor communities of 
                                                     
48 NESTLE, supra note 5, at 352. 
49 Nancy Huehnergarth, The Masterminds Behind the Phony Anti-Soda Tax Coalitions, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (July 16, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/07/the-masterminds-behind-the-phony-anti-
soda-tax-coalitions/#.WiG_7FWnEdU. 
50 David Gianastasio, Bloomberg Shown in Drag in Ad Protesting Ban on Supersized Drinks, ADWEEK 
(June 4, 2012), http://www.adweek.com/creativity/bloomberg-shown-drag-ad-protesting-ban-supersized-
drinks-140911/#/. 
51 NESTLE, supra note 5, at 352.  
52 Paul A. Diller, The Illusion of Autonomy in “Food” Litigation, 41 AM. J. LAW & MED. 274, 280 (2015). 
53 Bahar Gholipour, Americans Would Vote Against NYC Soda Ban, Poll Says, LIVE SCI. (June 26, 2013), 
https://www.livescience.com/37780-soda-ban-poll.html. 
54 But see generally Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience 
and Regressivity, 5 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL'Y 302 (2013) (showing that low income consumers are more 
responsive than other consumers to cigarette taxes not included in the price, possibly mitigating the 
regressivity of the tax). 
55 Sohyun Park, Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Among US Adults in 6 States: Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2011, 11 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE (2014). Nationwide, the federal 
government is estimated to pay at least $1.7 to $2.1 billion annually for sugar-sweetened beverages 
purchased in grocery stores, via SNAP. Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Grocery Store Beverage Choices by 
Participants in Federal Food Assistance and Nutrition Programs, 43 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 411, 411 
(2012). Relatedly, the burdens of disease associated with sugar-sweetened beverages disproportionately 
affect low income communities, so the benefits of the tax (assuming the tax effectively reduces disease) are 
progressive even if the tax itself is regressive. 
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color was effectively deployed by the beverage industry in its effort to defeat proposed 
sugar-sweetened beverage regulations. For example, in Richmond, CA, the ABA hired a 
political consulting firm to campaign in 2012 against that city’s proposed sugared beverage 
tax.56 The city of Richmond had a history of racial division over environmental issues, with 
city leaders backed by Chevron insisting that white liberal environmentalists’ efforts to 
block Chevron’s plans to expand their refinery would cost African-Americans jobs.57 To 
defeat the proposed soda tax, the ABA’s consultant hired Black and Hispanic workers to 
staff phone banks to spread the message that the tax would hurt poor people.58 The ABA’s 
consultant placed advertisements on billboards depicting an elderly Black man who would 
be hurt by the soda tax.59 The tax was defeated by voters at the polls.60  
Concerns about nanny-stateism and regressivity thus became part of the public 
discourse on soda taxes. Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney proposed a beverage tax shortly 
after taking office in 2016, and the lessons from failed initiatives in other cities were not 
lost on him. He campaigned on a promise of providing preschool education to every child 
in the city. As part of his budget, he proposed taxing sugar-sweetened beverages at 3 cents 
per ounce—higher than any other proposed tax in the country.61 Proposals to tax sodas had 
failed twice before in Philadelphia.62 To succeed this time, Kenney needed a way to avoid 
the powerful arguments of nanny-stateism and racial regressivity that the beverage industry 
deployed so effectively in the past. To neutralize the nanny-state concern, Kenney 
distanced himself from the “usual eat-your-vegetables approach of public health 
reformers.”63 Instead, he talked about that tax purely as a way to raise revenue—at 3 cents 
an ounce, the $400 million over five years would fully fund preschool and help fund 
popular city projects like community centers, school improvements, parks, libraries, and 
municipal pensions.64 When asked about the health benefits of the tax, he responded, 
“There’s really serious health benefits in pre-K.”65 
The opportunity to grapple with the disproportionate impact by race concern came 
later, when the city council was preparing to vote on the tax. After weeks of negotiations, 
the city council passed a modified version of Kenney’s proposal—instead of taxing sugar-
sweetened beverages only, the city would tax both sugar-sweetened and artificially 
sweetened beverages.66 And instead of 3 cents per ounce, the rate would be 1.5 cents per 
                                                     
56 Sheppard, supra note 28. 
57 Wendi Jonassen, Race-Baiting in Richmond East Bay Express, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Jan. 23, 2013), 
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/race-baiting-in-richmond/Content?oid=3441871. 
58 Id. 
59 NESTLE, supra note 5, at 369. 
60 Robert Rogers, Voters resoundingly reject Richmond ‘soda’ tax, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2012/11/06/voters-resoundingly-reject-richmond-soda-tax/. 
61 Margot Sanger-Katz, Making a Soda Tax More Politically Palatable, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/upshot/making-a-soda-tax-more-politically-palatable.html. 
62 Martha C. White, Philadelphia Tries for a More Palatable Soda-Tax Pitch, NBC NEWS (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/philly-tries-more-palatable-soda-tax-pitch-n578806. 
63 Sanger-katz, supra note 61. 
64 Id. 
65 Sanger-katz, supra note 61. 
66 Tricia L. Nadolny, Soda tax passes; Philadelphia is first big city in nation to enact one, PHILA. 
ENQUIRER (June 16, 2016), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20160617_Philadelphia_City_Council_to_vote_on_soda_tax.ht
ml. 
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ounce.67 The projected revenue from the new proposed tax was similar to the original 
proposal. The brunt of the tax would be borne not exclusively by consumers of sugar-
sweetened beverages, but by consumers of diet soft drinks as well. The upshot was that the 
anti-nanny state argument carried little weight because taxing both kinds of beverages 
makes more sense as a revenue raising device rather than a public health nudge. In addition, 
the concern that poor communities of color would be singled out on the assumption that a 
larger share of sugar-sweetened beverages are sold in those communities was now moot. 
And by halving the tax, the absolute burden for all consumers was reduced. The tax is of 
course still regressive, because both rich and poor are taxed at the same fixed amount, 
which is more difficult for the poor to bear than the rich.  
Besides messaging,68 resources available to the city were a factor that led to passage 
of the tax in Philadelphia. Although the beverage industry spent about $5 million to oppose 
the tax, the non-profit created to support the tax was infused with over $2 million, much of 
it from former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.69 Philadelphia became the 
second city in the nation (after Berkeley), and the first large U.S. city, to pass a substantial 
tax on beverages, at a rate predicted to substantially discourage consumption.70 Again, 
careful empirical study is needed to show the extent to which consumption decreases and 
health outcomes improve, if at all, as a result of enacting local soda taxes. 
 
III.  FROM POLITICS TO LAW: UNDERSTANDING SODA TAXES AS AN INTRASTATE 
PREEMPTION ISSUE 
 
A primary obstacle to the enactment of local soda taxes is resistance to the tax, 
understood either as an expression of nanny-state paternalism or as regressive, racially-
insensitive politics. But local politics alone will not decide whether local soda taxes 
become a major phenomenon in the United States. Indeed, the biggest obstacle to local 
soda taxes may turn out to be state law. The future of local soda taxes may depend on 
whether state legislatures and state courts (ostensibly effectuating state legislative intent) 
allow them to stand. As we discuss below, the biggest challenge for state soda taxes is 
express, not implied, preemption. We argue that express preemption statutes often should 
be deemed invalid, but at the same time, this viewpoint is not broadly embraced by state 
courts.     
 
                                                     
67 Id. 
68 Paarlberg, Mozaffarian, and Micha suggest that the persuasiveness of the political message might be 
specific to the process of the local tax enactment, such that a message primarily promoting increased 
revenue is most persuasive for city council votes, whereas a public health message is most persuasive for 
ballot issues. See Paarlberg, Mozaffarian & Micha, supra note 30, at 5. Paarlberg, Mozaffarian, and Micha, 
supra note 29.They base this argument on the recent successful ballot measures in the following cities: 
Berkeley, San Francisco, Oakland, Albany, CA, and Boulder, CO. Id. On the other hand, the residents of 
those cities might be especially receptive to public health arguments, and more impervious to nanny-state 
arguments than residents of other cities that might consider a soda tax ballot measure. 
69 Nadolny, supra note 66. 
70 Nadolny, supra note 66; PHILADELPHIA’S SWEET DEAL TO DISCOURAGE SUGAR CONSUMPTION 
WASHINGTON POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/philadelphias-sweet-deal-to-discourage-
sugar-consumption/2016/06/19/d8d7ab86-34bf-11e6-95c0-2a6873031302_story.html (last visited Dec 1, 
2017). 
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A. Implied Preemption 
 
Like the law of federal preemption of state and local law, intrastate preemption can 
be either implied or express.71 With limited (albeit important) exceptions discussed below, 
state courts generally recognize that state law can preempt local law, such as a local soda 
tax. State preemption of local law can be implied, as where the court infers an intent to 
preempt local law from the state legislature’s occupation of a field of law or regulation 
(sometimes called “field preemption”) or from the fact that the local law would pose an 
obstacle to an express state legislative objective (sometimes called “obstacle” or “conflict 
preemption”). In such implied preemption cases, the courts are called upon to find 
preemption without any clear textual basis in state law, and for that reason, implied 
preemption is an arena of substantial judicial discretion and has been criticized on that 
account.72 In express preemption cases, the state courts find preemption based on a clause 
in a statute that expressly purports to preempt local law. The legal question in express 
preemption cases is typically how broadly the court will read the express preemption clause 
when it is not entirely clear the clause applies to the local law at issue.73 
There are two reasons to believe that express state preemption laws pose a greater 
threat to local soda taxes than judicial findings of implied preemption. First, state courts 
sometimes hesitate to find implied preemption, in effect applying a presumption against 
preemption based on the idea that the state legislature intends to defer to local authority 
when it does not expressly address preemption.74 Second, both history and recent 
legislation in state legislatures suggest that industries such as the beverage industry will 
not rely on the mere possibility that state courts will find soda taxes to be impliedly 
preempted but rather will work to secure the passage of express preemption statutes in state 
legislatures throughout the country.75 After all, the beverage industry has the resources to 
                                                     
71 For an overview of the different kinds of intrastate preemption, see Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007). For a discussion of preemption in the federal-state context, see David A. Dana, 
Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption Symposium: Ordering State-Federal Relations Through 
Federal Preemption Doctrine, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 507 (2008).  
72 For examples of critical accounts of implied preemption, see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism 
and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS LAW J. 627–692 (2000); Diller, supra note 71; David J. Barron, Reclaiming 
Home Rule, 116 HARV. LAW REV. 2255–2386 (2003). 
73 See Diller, supra note 71, at 1115 n. 8 (“Determining the contours of the expressly ‘preempted field’ 
often generates significant disagreement within state courts.”).  
74 The state courts, however, are anything but consistent in this regard. See Diller, supra note 71. at 1116 
(“State courts have applied these tests inconsistently, sometimes upholding local authority and sometimes 
restricting it.”). The most notable recent implied preemption case addresses fracking. In Colorado, a home 
rule state that has a history of the courts taking local regulatory authority seriously, the State Supreme 
Court nonetheless found that local bans on fracking were impliedly preempted by the state statute 
governing oil and gas operations. City of Longmont et al. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n et al., 369 P.3d 573, 
573–86 (Colo. 2016); City of Ft. Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 586–95 (Colo. 2016). In 
the case of oil and gas extraction, there was a plausible argument that the industry is a mainstay of the state 
economy and that the industry could not effectively contend with a patchwork of local operational rules, 
including local bans, and continue effective exploration and extraction. With regard to soda taxes, however, 
the economic centrality of the sale of soda beverages in any state is highly questionable, and it is much 
more difficult to envision an argument that different tax rates in a few localities would make it very 
burdensome to distribute and sell soda in a state. Still, one can imagine these arguments being put forward. 
75 State preemption of local nutrition regulations are part of a recent broader pattern of high-profile city-
state conflicts over polarizing social issues such as immigration, guns, discrimination, and environmental 
protection. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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intensively lobby state legislatures to pass express preemption statutes, just as, in the past, 
the tobacco and gun industries have done.  
Indeed, tobacco provides a very useful analogy to soda.76 Just as localities have 
sought to limit tobacco consumption out of interest in protecting residents’ public health, 
localities are now seeking measures to limit soda consumption. The beverage industry, like 
the tobacco industry, is dominated by mega-corporations that can invest in developing and 
maintaining ties with state legislatures and wielding influence over state legislative 
debates. And the beverage industry can make free-market, anti-paternalism appeals at the 
state level, in the same way that the tobacco industry has done. Although the dangers of 
smoking are widely acknowledged, the tobacco industry has succeeded in keeping in place 
many state express preemption statutes that foreclose local initiatives. According to one 
count, twenty-two states have laws that preempt local ordinances related to youth access 
to tobacco products, and twelve states have laws in effect that explicitly preempt local 
ordinances from restricting smoking in public spaces like restaurants and bars and in work 
places.77 
Moreover, history aside, the current political divergence between very blue 
(Democratic) cities in states with very red (Republican) legislatures makes express 
preemption at the state level an appealing strategy for the beverage industry, as well as 
other industries that face unwelcome local regulation.78 Where both houses of a state 
legislature are dominated by conservative Republicans, the leadership may support express 
preemption statutes that, in effect, are reprimands to liberal cities to which the leadership 
owes no allegiance and from which it draws no support. Indeed, with the federal 
government controlled by one party, but still relatively inactive as a legislative matter, the 
principal focus for industry in the next few years might be the lobbying of state legislatures 
aimed at curbing local initiatives.79 
                                                     
Among these are city-state conflicts over specific examples of city attempts to advance environmental 
protection goals, such as imposing a 5-cent excise tax on plastic bags provided by grocers to customers at 
the register. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Cuomo Blocks New York City Plastic Bag Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/nyregion/cuomo-blocks-new-york-city-plastic-bag-
law.html. Courts have been unwilling to strike down these local efforts in the absence of state legislative 
action that specifically prohibits the local excise tax in question. See Nadav Shoked, Cities Gaining Ground 
on States: The Surprisingly Permissive Treatment of Local Excise Taxation, OHIO ST. L. J. (forthcoming 
2018). 
76 Rob Waters, Soda and Fast Food Lobbyists Push State Preemption Laws to Prevent Local Regulation, 
FORBES (June 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robwaters/2017/06/21/soda-and-fast-food-lobbyists-
push-state-preemption-laws-to-prevent-local-regulation/#1a403cdf745d (explaining that the tobacco 
industry pursued a “50-state strategy,” in trying to get preemption laws passed in statehouses around the 
country). “This effort was outlined by Philip Morris executive Tina Walls, who called statewide 
preemption ‘the solution’ and advocated for preemptive statewide legislation as a way to ‘shift the battle 
away from the community level back to the state legislature, where we are on stronger ground . . . .’” Id. 
The gun industry pursued a similar strategy. Id. 
77 See TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, PREEMPTION: THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE TO TOBACCO 
CONTROL 3 (2014), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-preemption-
tobacco-control-challenge-2014.pdf.  
78 See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage through 
Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1083–86 (2016) (framing preemption debates in terms of 
the marked divergence between innovative, liberal cities and more conservative, non-urban areas in states 
such as North Carolina).   
79 See Sandhya Somashekhar, In Austin, the Air Smells of Tacos and Trees—and City-state Conflict, WASH. 
POST, (July 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-austin-the-air-smells-of-tacos-and-trees-
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In fact, with the aid of the powerful, yet little-known (to the general public), 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), the beverage and processed food 
industries already have secured in some states express preemption statutes that limit the 
legal authority of localities to act to improve local nutrition and, hence, public health. 
Apparently in response to New York City’s 2008 initiative to curb portion sizes for soda 
and local efforts to require the posting of calorie counts at restaurants,80 ALEC drafted a 
model “Food and Nutrition” state law, which has as its express purpose, to “preempt[] 
towns, counties and other political subdivisions from enacting regulation in regards to food 
service establishments based upon or regarding food nutrition information, customer 
incentive items.”81 The Act forbids localities from “ban[ing], prohibit[ing], or otherwise 
restrict[ing] a food service operation based upon the existence or non-existence of food-
based health disparities as recognized by the department of health, the institute of health, 
or the centers for disease control.”82 
The ALEC bill, in whole or part, has been adopted in ten states, with Kansas adopting 
the ALEC bill word for word.83 The adopting states—Kansas, Utah, Ohio, Wisconsin, 
                                                     
-and-city-state-conflict/2017/07/01/682eb420-54f7-11e7-ba90-f5875b7d1876_story.html. See also NAT’L 
LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2017), 
http://nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/NLC%20Preemption%20Report%202017.pdf. 
80 In the 2010 Affordable Care Act, federal law followed New York City’s lead, requiring chain restaurants 
to label menus with nutritional information. The FDA recently extended the deadline for compliance by 
one year to May 2018. Menu Labeling Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrit
ion/ucm515020.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).   
81 See Food and Nutrition Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/model-policy/food-
and-nutrition-act/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
82 Id. 
83 Kansas 12-16, 137 states, in part, “The state of Kansas, and any political subdivision thereof, shall not do 
any of the following: 
(1) Enact, adopt or continue in effect local legislation relating to the provision or nonprovision of food 
nutrition information or consumer incentive items at food service operations; 
(2) condition any license, permit or regulatory approval upon the provision or nonprovision of food 
nutrition information or consumer incentive items at food service operations; 
(3) ban, prohibit or otherwise restrict food at food service operations based upon the food's nutrition 
information or upon the provision or nonprovision of consumer incentive items; 
(4) condition any license, permit or regulatory approval for a food service operation upon the existence or 
nonexistence of food-based health disparities; 
(5) where food service operations are permitted to operate, ban, prohibit or otherwise restrict a food service 
operation based upon the existence or nonexistence of food-based health disparities as recognized by the 
department of health, the institute of health or the centers for disease control; 
(6) restrict the sale, distribution or serving of foods and nonalcoholic beverages that are approved for sale 
by the United States department of agriculture or other federal or state government agencies; or 
(7) restrict the growing or raising of livestock or grain, vegetables, fruits or other crops grown or raised for 
food and approved for sale by the United States department of agriculture or other federal or state 
government agencies.” 
The ALEC model Food and Nutrition Act states, in part 3: “(A) No political subdivision shall do any of the 
following: 
(1)  Enact, adopt, or continue in effect local legislation relating to the provision or non-provision of food 
nutrition information or consumer incentive items at food service operations; 
(2)  Condition any license, permit, or regulatory approval upon the provision or non-provision of food 
nutrition information or consumer incentive items at food service operations; 
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Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, and North Carolina84—do include 
“blue” cities like Madison, Wisconsin and Cleveland, Ohio where, in theory, local politics 
might support passage of a soda tax. And, while these ALEC-based state statutes do not 
expressly address soda taxes, they conceivably could be read to preempt them, as discussed 
below.   
The beverage industry, moreover, appears to be moving beyond the ALEC bill and 
is seeking to secure passage of statutes specifically preempting local soda taxes.85 There is 
no reason to believe that the beverage industry, following the tobacco industry model, will 
stop pushing such legislation in state legislatures. Two relevant questions, therefore, are: 
(1) Are there limits on the legal validity of such statutes, assuming they secure state 
legislative passage?; and (2) Are there political constraints on state legislative passage and, 
in particular, can advocates for soda taxes (and local nutritional measures generally) 
strengthen those constraints? 
 
B. The (Limited) Legal Limits on Express State Preemption: The Cleveland and 
Philadelphia Cases 
 
Where a state passes an express preemption statute that arguably addresses soda 
taxes, there are two possible legal strategies for asserting that the statute does not, in fact, 
preempt local law. First, in some home rule jurisdictions, there is a possibility that the state 
constitution or home rule statutes or both limit the authority of the legislature to preempt 
local taxes and regulation. The strongest support for this argument is found in a recent Ohio 
appellate court decision.86 However, while normatively appealing, this home rule argument 
is undercut by the fact that the courts in some home rule states have interpreted home rule 
so as to favor state power over local autonomy. Second, where there is ambiguity as to the 
reach of an express preemption statute, the state courts might refuse to read it expansively, 
for fear of disrupting local authority over matters where such authority is well-established, 
as the Pennsylvania courts arguably have done (so far) in a lawsuit involving Philadelphia’s 
soda tax.87 Nonetheless, a well-drafted express preemption statute is likely to be upheld 
and enforced by almost all state courts.  
                                                     
(3)  Ban, prohibit, or otherwise restrict food at food service operations based upon the food’s nutrition 
information or upon the provision or non-provision of consumer incentive items; 
(4)  Condition any license, permit, or regulatory approval for a food service operation upon the existence or 
non-existence of food-based health disparities; 
(5) Where food service operations are permitted to operate, ban, prohibit, or otherwise restrict a food 
service operation based upon the existence or non-existence of food-based health disparities as recognized 
by the department of health, the institute of health, or the centers for disease control.” 
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/food-and-nutrition-act/ 
84 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Mark Pertschuk, State Preemption: A Significant and Quiet Threat to Public 
Health in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 900, 900–02 (2017) (discussing legislation). See also 
Preemption Watch, GRASSROOTS CHANGE, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/ (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2017) (maintaining a website that keeps a current list of state preemption laws involving a range of 
issues). 
85 See Soda And Fast Food Lobbyists Push State Preemption Laws To Prevent Local Regulation, supra 
note 76. 
86 See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
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In states that accord some localities home rule power, the localities have a right to 
legislate free from state interference, notwithstanding that localities in all states are 
regarded as creatures of state law. But, the range of home rule powers accorded localities 
is limited. In a number of states, home rule only encompasses local authority over the 
structure of local government and personnel matters.88 Less often, the home rule includes 
general regulatory authority or authority over local taxation. By one count, only twelve 
states accord a measure of fiscal home rule to localities and even then, the extent of local 
authority actually recognized by the courts may be quite limited.89 In California, for 
example, localities were blocked from imposing bag taxes until state law was altered to 
allow them to do so.90   
 
1. Express Preemption Targeting a Specific Local Ordinance 
 
Ohio is one of the states that accords home rule authority to localities in a meaningful 
way, and it is an Ohio precedent that provides the strongest basis for an argument by a 
locality that an express preemption statute regarding local soda taxes would be invalid. 
Under Ohio case law, “[a] state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) 
the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) 
the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.”91 To qualify 
as a general law, an Ohio statute must:  
 
(1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) 
apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the 
state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport 
only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set 
forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of 
conduct upon citizens generally.92 
 
In Cleveland v. State,93 an intermediate appellate court applied this “general law” test 
to an ordinance that the City of Cleveland enacted banning trans-fat in some stores and 
restaurants.94 According to the Cleveland ordinance, “[n]o foods containing industrially-
produced trans-fat, as defined in this section, shall be stored, distributed, held for service, 
used in preparation of any menu item or served in any food shop . . . except food that is 
being served directly to patrons in a manufacturer’s original sealed package.”95 The Ohio 
legislature responded by enacting a (close to identical) version of the ALEC bill that 
removed a locality’s authority to “[b]an, prohibit, or otherwise restrict food at food service 
                                                     
88 See Diller, supra note 78, at 1066. 
89 Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to do About Them, 
91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 301 (2016). 
90 Id. at 297. See also A Short History of Plastic Bag Laws in California, PLASTICBAGLAWS.ORG, 
http://plasticbaglaws.org/get-involved/plastic-bag-facts/a-short-history-of-plastic-bag-laws-in-california/ 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
91 Cleveland v. Ohio, 942 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 2010) (quoting Mendenhall v. Akron, 881 N.E.2d 255, 
260 (Ohio 2008)) (internal quotations omitted).  
92 Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Ohio 2002). 
93 989 N.E.2d 1072, 1072–87 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
94 Id. at 1080–87. 
95 Id. at 1075. 
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operations based on the food nutrition information,” where food nutrition information was 
broadly defined to “include[], but is not limited to, the caloric, fat, carbohydrate, 
cholesterol, fiber, sugar, potassium, protein, vitamin, mineral, allergen, and sodium content 
of food.”96 “‘Food nutrition information’ also includes the designation of food as healthy 
or unhealthy.”97  
The City of Cleveland then filed a declaratory judgment motion seeking a declaration 
that the state statute was not a “general law” under Ohio law and thus could not preempt 
Cleveland’s trans-fat ban. Both the trial and appellate court agreed the state preemption 
statute was not a “general” law and, therefore, could not preempt the Cleveland ordinance. 
According to the appellate court:  
 
Ohio law is largely devoid of specific food content regulation such as that 
found in [the Cleveland Ordinance]. Indeed, the state cites only three 
statutes concerning any form of content regulation and those statutes are 
narrowly limited to the specific regulation of dairy products (R.C. 917.02; 
R.C. 917.05), certain beverages (R.C. 913.24) and the vitamin and mineral 
content of certain bakery products (R.C. 911.33; R.C. 911.32).98  
 
Therefore, the State had no comprehensive legislative enactment of which the 
express preemption law could be considered a part; rather, the express preemption law was 
a naked, stand-alone limit on municipal power. Thus understood, the state preemption law 
was not a general law, and hence not effective with regard to Cleveland’s trans-fat 
ordinance.  
The normative grounding for Cleveland v. State is sound, even though it is not fully 
explored in the appellate opinion, which instead closely hews to the formal doctrinal tests. 
If state law generally grants home rule powers to regulate to localities (as it does in Ohio), 
then the state legislature’s attempt to undo local regulation by enacting a state statute does 
not comport with state home rule law and should be deemed ineffective. State home rule 
law—especially when enshrined as state constitutional law—by definition permits 
localities to pass laws governing themselves as they see fit. Because of this, it is not a 
legitimate purpose for a state to attempt to block local regulatory action simply for the sake 
of blocking it. Thus, there needs to be, as the Ohio court suggests, something more—a 
reason why the local regulation at issue will be harmful in a way that other local regulation 
is not, and harmful to such a degree as to override the basic allocation of authority inherent 
in home rule. One such reason, although perhaps not the only conceivable one, would be 
that the State has in place its own relevant scheme of regulation that is in conflict with, and 
would be less effective because of, local regulation. In other words, if home rule as to 
regulatory authority is to be taken seriously, then an express preemption statute standing 
alone should be effective only if preemption would be justified as a matter of implied 
obstacle preemption.   
From a political process/democratic theory perspective, there are also benefits to 
allowing local preemption only when it is part of a larger scheme of state regulation. When 
state legislatures act to preempt local regulation, they may be able to act very quickly, with 
                                                     
96 Id. at 1076–77. 
97 Id. at 1076. 
98 Id. at 1081. 
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little public debate, inasmuch as what they are purporting to do is simply pass a prohibition. 
But, where a state legislature seeks to enact a scheme of regulation that includes express 
preemption as only one component, the legislative process is likely to be more deliberate 
and to attract more attention from affected constituencies. All else being equal, therefore, 
the level of public engagement in such cases will be greater than when a simple express 
preemption law is all that is at issue. 
While the formal and political-theoretical grounding for the Cleveland v. State 
approach is sound, its precedential reach is debatable. Even in Ohio, and certainly 
elsewhere, courts have readily found that there is enough relevant state regulation so as to 
characterize a state preemption provision part of a general law and not a naked attempt to 
block local regulation.99 Thus, all a state legislature might need to do to transform a non-
general law into a general one is to add some uncontroversial and not-very-meaningful 
state regulation to accompany a preemption provision. Moreover, outside of Ohio and 
certainly outside of the relatively few robust home rule states, the argument of the 
Cleveland v. State court simply has no purchase, even as persuasive authority. 
 
2. Express Preemption Limiting Local Authority More Generally 
 
Soda taxes may also be challenged on the basis of express preemption statutes due 
to courts perceiving them as encompassing soda taxes, even if they do not explicitly address 
the issue of soda taxation. For example, the ALEC-style statutes regarding food content 
adopted by ten states do not mention taxes, but they easily could be read to encompass such 
taxes. These statutes seem to cover all local food-content regulation.100 Soda taxes could 
be conceptualized as a form of regulation in the sense that they are intended to regulate: to 
shape behavior rather than serve as a revenue-generating device per se. The line between a 
regulation and a tax can be unclear in practice.101  
Alternatively, the soda tax, even when imposed in the form of an excise tax on soda 
distributors, could be understood as a kind of sales tax to the extent that it increases the 
retail sales price of soda. The line between a sales tax and an upstream distribution tax, 
especially if one focuses on market effects, also may be unclear, as the recent litigation 
regarding the Philadelphia soda tax illustrates. As noted earlier, the Philadelphia tax is 
imposed on, and collected from, distributors of beverages.102 The tax is not paid at the cash 
                                                     
99 For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld a state statute preempting local gun control ordinances. 
Cleveland v. State, 942 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 2010). On the other hand, a trial court in Ohio recently 
upheld a local ordinance favoring the hiring of local firms for public works projects, in part because the 
state statute preempting local firms requirements was not part of a comprehensive scheme of state 
regulation. See Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Rules in City of Cleveland’s Favor on Residency 
Lawsuit, HARPST ROSS, LTD., http://www.harpstross.com/blog/786-2/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).  
100 FLA. STAT. § 509.032(7)(a), for example, preempts local “regulation of public lodging establishments 
and public food service establishments, including, but not limited to, sanitation standards, inspections, 
training and testing of personnel, and matters related to the nutritional content and marketing of foods 
offered in such establishments.” A soda tax could be conceptualized as regulation relating to “nutritional 
content.” GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-373 (West 2011) provides that no locality “shall enact any ordinance or 
issue any rules and regulations pertaining to the provision of food nutrition information at food service 
establishments.” 
101 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax 
and Other Regulatory Taxes, 1 ACCT., ECON. & L. 1 (2011). 
102 See Sanger-Katz, supra note 63.   
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register when people buy soda. This design for the tax may save it from legal invalidity 
under Pennsylvania’s Sterling Act, which was enacted in 1954 and which sought to ensure 
uniformity in tax burdens throughout the State.103 The Act provides that “the council of 
any city . . . shall have the authority [to]. . . collect . . . taxes” except the council shall not 
have the authority to collect any tax “which is now or may hereafter become subject to a 
State tax or license fee.”104 Thus, since the state government of Pennsylvania already 
imposes a sales tax on soda (as well as food generally), the Philadelphia soda tax would be 
barred by the Sterling Act if it is understood as a tax on the sale of soda. Pennsylvania does 
not have an excise tax on the distribution of soda. Therefore, Philadelphia’s soda tax is not 
preempted by the Sterling Act if the soda tax is understood to be a distribution tax and such 
a tax is understood to be different, in a legally meaningful way, from a sales tax. Although 
Pennsylvania is the only state to date where the issue has arisen out of a conflict between 
a local soda tax and state law seeking state tax uniformity, there are other states that limit 
the authority of localities to impose sales taxes.105 The question of whether a soda tax is an 
impermissible sales tax could arise in other states in the future. 
The Philadelphia trial and appellate courts took a formalist approach to the 
intersection of the Sterling Act and Philadelphia’s soda tax. The trial court simply opined 
that “[t]he tax is levied on distributors and dealers, and the court is constrained to ignore 
how these taxpayers would absorb the additional cost . . . .”106 And the appellate court 
majority concluded that because “the PBT taxes non-retail distribution transactions and not 
retail sales,” it “does not violate the duplicative-tax prohibition in the Sterling Act” 
inasmuch as “the taxes do not share the same incidence and merely have related 
subjects.”107 The dissent in the appellate court faulted the majority for placing form over 
economic substance, and argued, “A review of the PBT in its entirety reveals that it is in 
fact duplicative of the Sales Tax.”108  
There are plausible arguments in support of and against this literalist approach. One 
argument against stretching the range of express preemption provisions beyond their clear 
meaning is that doing so creates uncertainty as to the range of permissible local authority 
and thus may disrupt the basic allocation of authority between the State and localities upon 
which a range of public and private actors have relied. The result may be costly litigation 
and the chilling of local governance. For example, if the Philadelphia tax is held to be 
equivalent to a sales tax because it has downstream effects on sales prices, would that mean 
city fees paid by restaurants are also preempted by the Sterling Act because such fees are 
largely passed along to customers when they purchase meals? The counterargument, of 
course, is that localities should not be encouraged to work around legislative intent by 
structuring taxes or other measures so they technically fall outside the wording of express 
preemption statutes but have the same effect as measures that squarely fall within the 
                                                     
103 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15971 (West 2017). 
104 Id. 
105 See RUTE PINHO, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, LOCAL OPTION TAXES (2013), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0345.htm (explaining that thirty-eight states authorize local sales 
taxes, although usually in a capped percentage of the sales price).  
106 Vidya Kauri, Pa. Legislators Urge Court to Undo Philly Soda Ruling, LAW360 (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/889370/pa-legislators-urge-court-to-undo-philly-soda-tax-ruling (quoting 
trial court opinion).  
107 Williams v. City of Phila., 164 A.3d 576, 588 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).  
108 Id. at 597 (Covey, J., dissenting).  
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language of an express preemption statute.  
But the broader, non-literalist reading of preemption clauses may pose a larger risk 
to reliance interests, as it may expose long-established local measures to preemption suits. 
The slippery slope scenario involving cities working to get out from under express 
preemption statutes assumes there are many actions cities want to take but cannot because 
of express preemption statutes, but there is no obvious reason to think that often will be the 
case. Moreover, given the ease with which highly specific express preemption statutes are 
currently being enacted, as reflected by their relative abundance, the absence of an express 
preemption statute that is literally, directly applicable to the issue at hand can be read as 
evidence of a lack of intent on the part of the legislature to preempt.  
Broad readings of express preemption statutes also would seem contrary to a 
normative assumption of home rule frameworks—that local autonomy and 
experimentation are goods in and of themselves and generally should be encouraged. If 
those are home rule values (whether they are always honored in practice or not), then it 
would seem that state courts should employ a presumption against preemption in close 
cases, just as federal courts embrace such a presumption in federal preemption cases as a 
way to acknowledge federalism values.109 Application of that presumption supports literal 
readings of express preemption statutes such as the Sterling Act. 
These kinds of argument for and against literalist readings of express preemption 
statutes could have been better expressed by the Philadelphia trial and appellate courts. The 
two decisions are very short in the way of reasoning. But the decisions involving the 
Philadelphia tax, if upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, provide precedential 
support for courts reading express preemption provisions literally so as to allow soda taxes 
to stand unless such taxes very directly and obviously fall within the statutory language 
regarding preemption. So too, although less directly, do literalist decisions holding that 
express preemption of local gun regulation does not encompass local gun taxes.110  
In sum, there is some room for defending a soda tax even in the face of an express 
preemption statute. It can be argued, as in the Philadelphia litigation, that an express 
preemption statute simply does not cover the tax if the statutory language does not literally 
do so. And, at least in Ohio and possibly other home rule states, even an express preemption 
provision regarding soda taxes might not constitute a general law capable of preempting 
local law if it is not part of larger substantive scheme of regulation. But, in general, in a 
jurisdiction with a well-drafted express preemption statute explicitly addressing soda taxes, 
local tax ordinances will be preempted. Thus, a key question is: what factors will make it 
more or less likely that jurisdictions will adopt such express preemption statutes? In the 
next section, we consider three such possible factors.     
 
IV. THE POLITICS OF EXPRESS STATE PREEMPTION AND THE POSSIBLE VALUE OF 
ENDOWMENT EFFECTS, DATA, AND BROADER NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS 
                                                     
109 See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption 
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2012). 
110 Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 14 (Wash. 2017); see also Daniel Beekman, The Washington 
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Whether soda taxes are subject to targeted express preemption statutes may depend 
on a number of factors, of which this Part explores three: (1) the timing of the local soda 
tax ordinances in relation to state attempts to preempt; (2) the evidence of effectiveness 
and benefits of soda taxes at the time state legislatures consider express preemption; and 
(3) the ability to reframe the state legislature preemption debate in broad terms rather than 
around single issues. In sum, if a number of provably effective local soda taxes ordinances 
can be put into effect quickly throughout the country and the debate over state preemption 
is re-oriented, it is less likely that such taxes will be expressly preempted. At the same time, 
we recognize that the possibility for re-orienting the debate over state preemption in state 
legislatures is more problematic in states where the legislatures are strongly aligned with 
and ideologically predisposed toward the interests of industry.  
 
A. The Race to Legislate: Are State Preemption Efforts Less Likely After Local 
Ordinances Are Adopted? 
 
State legislatures sometimes pass express preemption statutes even before there is 
anything to preempt: Kansas’ nutrition-preemption law, for example, was enacted even 
though Kansas City was proposing the kind of measures it preempts. On the other hand, 
some state preemption statutes are clearly passed in response to local ordinances: in Ohio, 
for example, a statute barring local regulation of commerce in pets was a response to two 
Ohio localities banning commercial sales of pets;111 in Tennessee, a statute prohibiting 
unelected local officials from enacting rules regarding food nutrition information was a 
response to the Nashville Metropolitan Board of Health’s requirement that chain 
restaurants provide calorie counts on their menus.112 
Where a state legislature passes preemptive legislation proactively, before there are 
any local ordinances to preempt, the possibility of ultimately passing local ordinances 
would seem to be very remote. It is a powerful argument against organizing a local political 
campaign to enact a soda tax—with all the costs and risks attached to it—that the whole 
enterprise is futile because state law already forbids such an ordinance. As Shilpan and 
Volden have argued in the context of local anti-smoking ordinances, “the usefulness and 
hence the likelihood of passage” of a local ordinance are “greatly diminished” once the 
state has enacted a statute that could be read as preempting such an ordinance.113  Thus, 
proponents of soda taxes face the challenge that state preemption laws will pass and thus 
undermine local organizing before it can even begin. 
In our view, the best strategy for enacting local soda taxes is to establish them in 
multiple localities in a state before any state preemption law is passed.114 The more 
                                                     
111 Jim Siegel, Pet Store Regulations Stir Debate, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/05/11/pet-store-regulations-causing-quite-the-debate-
at-the-statehouse.html; see also Waters, supra note 76 (explaining that the Tennessee legislature preempted 
localities from adopting ordinances requiring restaurants to display calorie counts while such an ordinance 
was under consideration in Nashville).  
112 S.B. 1092, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009); see Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public 
Health: Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1239 (2013). 
113 Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanics of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 843 
(2008). 
114 Shipan and Volden’s study of anti-smoking ordinances also suggests that early adoption by a large city 
will result in more policy diffusion than early adoption by small localities, as there is a tendency for local 
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localities there are that have passed a soda tax, the greater the general political salience any 
debate over express preemption will have. If only one city has passed a soda tax, and hence 
the issue is salient only in one locale in the state, local officials and voters from the rest of 
the state will be less inclined to pay much attention, as their direct stakes in the express 
preemption debate will seem speculative, even if they think they would support such a tax. 
By contrast, the beverage industry does not need broad political salience to organize 
effective lobbying at the state level. The industry has the organizational benefits that 
Mancur Olson ascribed to concentrated interest groups,115 and its perspective is national 
and very much oriented toward preventing a movement against soda taxes. The industry 
will invest resources in state preemption regardless of whether one or fifty localities in the 
state have adopted a soda tax. If citizens from multiple localities feel invested in their own 
local soda tax ordinance, it is less likely that a state preemption effort after the fact will be 
able to sail through the state legislature without opposition.  
The passage of local soda taxes can also change the state political economy 
dynamics. Local soda tax ordinances can give rise to interest groups composed of citizens 
who directly benefit from the dedicated soda tax revenue. In Pennsylvania, there are clear 
and well-known recipients of soda tax revenue—Philadelphia parents of young children 
and pre-K/daycare providers. Those recipients will come to understand the soda tax as 
conferring on them a benefit—an endowment.116  In general, people are more motivated to 
preserve an endowment, to prevent the loss of what they already have, than they are to fight 
for something of equal economic value they do not yet have.117 By endowing citizens with 
a valuable resource based on the soda tax stream, the Philadelphia linkage of soda taxes 
with a popular public program may not only have made it easier to secure passage of the 
local ordinance, but also may make it less likely that the tax will be undone by a state 
express preemption statute. If this reasoning is correct, then soda tax advocates in and out 
of government should consider earmarking the tax funds for tangible benefits, and they 
should do what they can to make sure the beneficiaries of the tax funds understand 
themselves as such.     
 
B. Do Facts Matter: Will Evidence About Benefits and Burdens of Soda Taxes 
Influence State Preemption? 
 
Many of the arguments invoked in support of state preemption are empirical 
arguments. Yet these arguments are usually put forth without actual empirical evidence. 
Thus, for example, the Ohio legislators arguing for preemption of local commercial pet 
store bans argue that these pet stores are needed, because otherwise, there will be more 
                                                     
officials in smaller localities to imitate the actions of large cities. See id. Thus, adoption of a soda tax by 
Philadelphia or Chicago may have a broader impact than adoption by Boulder or Berkeley.  
115 Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 
(1965) at 132. 
116 According to a recent Gallup poll, six in ten Americans support the idea of free child-care and pre-K for 
all families. Lydia Saad, Americans Buy Free Pre-K: Split on Tuition-Free College, GALLUP NEWS (May 2, 
2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/191255/americans-buy-free-pre-split-tuition-free-college.aspx.  
117 See George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. J. 929, 929 
(1995) (demonstrating that people underestimate the extent to which they will value a good in the future 
once they receive it); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 193–206 (1991) (exploring the concepts 
of loss aversion and endowment effect).  
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unlicensed breeding and uncared-for animals.118 Similarly, opponents of soda taxes argue 
that the taxes will lead to the closing of small businesses while doing nothing to improve 
overall nutrition.119   
To the extent some legislators and governors act based on what they believe is good, 
evidence-based policy, the collection of data showing that a local measure will have 
benefits without great costs could help in a campaign against express state preemption. 
Such evidence is only possible if a number of localities can implement a measure and if 
reliable data is collected and analyzed by groups or people who will be regarded as 
reasonably neutral. Data may be convincing even if it comes from places other than one 
where the preemption debate is occurring, if the ordinances at issue are otherwise similar. 
If this reasoning is correct, then one agenda item for advocates of soda taxes should be to 
support research on the effects of such taxes.   
 
C. Reframing the Intrastate Preemption Debate 
 
Perhaps the most effective (if not necessarily politically feasible) way to combat 
express preemption of soda taxes would be to reframe the way state legislatures approach 
local preemption. In current practices, legislatures in both home rule and non-home rule 
states feel free to enact issue-specific statutes expressly preempting particular choices by 
local authorities. This seems to be true even where home rule is enshrined in some form in 
the state constitution.120 There is no internal state legislative rule in any State that limits 
the type of issues that are subject to express state preemption. Nor are there any special 
internal state legislative rules for how express preemption must be considered and adopted. 
In this context, the debate over express preemption focuses on whether state legislators like 
or dislike the particular policy choices made by localities. If legislators do not like them, 
they can preempt them, if they can muster a legislative majority. There is no principled 
basis upon which local choices are or are not subject to express preemption, thus obscuring 
the larger questions of how much sway localism and local autonomy should have and in 
what arenas. 
If the legislative debate were reframed as one not over “are-soda-taxes-good-or-bad” 
but rather over the proper range of local autonomy, legislators of different political stripes 
might be able to find more common ground. The conservative Republicans at the state level 
now pushing express preemption, after all, hail from a party and tradition that has 
trumpeted localism and dispersed authority.121 In such a reframed debate, legislators might 
                                                     
118 See Siegel, supra note 111. 
119 See Why Food & Drink Taxes Won’t Work, REJECT NEEDLESS TAXES, http://www.fooddrinktax.eu/tax-
doesnt-work/tax-is-ineffective/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (collecting and highlighting evidence from 
studies and reports).  
120 Diller proposes an invigorated form of constitutional home rule as a response to the excessive 
preemption of local initiatives, including highly innovative ones. Diller, supra note 78, at 1066–73. While 
there is merit in that proposal, constitutional provisions for home rule by themselves have not stopped 
express preemption, and constitutional amendment is a very difficult process in many states. More 
procedurally-oriented reforms in state legislative processes might yield comparable benefits, while being 
easier to achieve. 
121 One of the questions raised by the ascendance of Republicans in Congress and the state legislatures is 
whether the traditional Republican/conservative rhetoric regarding federalism and localism reflected real 
philosophical commitments or whether it solely was employed to serve instrumental ends. See Ilya Somin, 
Federalism as Insurance, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
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be able to agree on content-neutral categories of local choices that presumptively should 
not be preempted, and they might be able to agree on procedural rules that could instantiate 
that presumption. Examples of such procedural rules include a rule requiring public hearing 
on any express preemption proposal or a rule requiring a supermajority for the passage of 
an express preemption law. In addition to the philosophical and rhetorical power of 
localism, these proposals might also gain political traction because they could be a benefit 
to a party in power in the state legislature if there were a real possibility that the next 
election or two would leave them out of power (just as the filibuster rule in the U.S. Senate 
benefits both parties by limiting the power of whichever party happens to command a 
majority after the last election). If special rules for express preemption ever were to become 
a political reality, then it most likely would not be in the states with entrenched “red” 
legislatures and activist “blue” cities, but rather states where the politics at state and local 




Increasingly, state and local governments are looking to the possibility of imposing 
or increasing taxes on soda both as a way to raise substantial revenue, and possibly as a 
way to improve public health. In the public discourse, the perception that the government 
is acting as a nanny by deciding what is or is not good or healthy to eat and drink often 
garners widespread attention and sympathy. In American culture, freedom of choice is 
highly valued.122 When government is perceived as taking away choice in an area of daily 
living as basic and fundamental as food and drink, Americans sometimes view such efforts 
with skepticism, especially if the reasons for the proposed limitations are viewed as 
paternalistic.123 When a state or local government proposes to tax soda, paternalism 
concerns are often compounded by suspicion that citizens who are more vulnerable will be 
asked to shoulder an unfair tax burden. Even in an era where the financial positions of some 
state and local governments are extremely weak and revenue is desperately needed, public 
resistance to efforts to tax soda can be difficult to overcome. Yet, as in Philadelphia, these 
political objections can be muted when there is a commitment to use the tax revenue for a 
popular initiative with readily identifiable beneficiaries.  
A very different hurdle that local governments in particular face when attempting to 
implement soda taxes is the possibility of preemption by state law. Although preemption 
is a legal hurdle, the likelihood of preemption as a barrier to local taxation of soda is 
influenced heavily by state and national politics. Just as the tobacco and gun industries 
have leveraged their substantial lobbying power in statehouses to attempt to preempt local 
tobacco and gun ordinances, the beverage industry has similar power and is likely to make 
similar efforts. These efforts are especially likely in Republican controlled statehouses 
                                                     
conspiracy/wp/2016/12/20/federalism-as-insurance/?utm_term=.02b0415e7413 (raising the question 
whether federalism commitments are genuine on either the “left or right”). 
122 World Values Survey data indicates that Americans were far more likely than citizens of other large 
Western democracies to say that they have an extremely high amount of freedom of choice and control over 
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where the proposals to tax soda are coming from liberal cities to which the state leaders 
owe no allegiance and receive little support at election time. The nation-wide reach of 
ALEC gives rise to the possibility of a wide variety of states enacting laws expressly 
preempting local nutrition ordinances. As a political matter, public health activists who 
seek local taxation of soda might be wise to try to ensure that as many local ordinances as 
possible are in place prior to the consideration by a state legislature of a state law 
preempting such taxes, because such proposed state legislation would visibly nullify local 
efforts to improve public health and would face the opposition not just of local officials, 
but also the beneficiaries of the tax revenue.  
